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Abstract 
This research project examines the behavior of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) workforce hypothesis regarding risk management in weapon system 
development. Two experiments were conducted to understand how the workforce 
approaches risk management.  
Many DoD programs fall behind and suffer a cost increase and schedule 
delay. A recent Government Accountability Office report stated, “The total cost of 
DoD’s 2011 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has grown by … 5 
percent, in the last year.”(GAO, 2012, p. 6) In addition, when compared to a 
program’s initial plans, the cost increase is much larger: “When measured from their 
first full estimates, … the growth in total acquisition cost for these programs is … 40 
percent.” (GAO, 2012, p. 6) 
Risk management is an important engineering tool for minimizing the impact 
of technical problems of a program. More effective risk management will lead to 
better managed programs. The purpose of this study is to better understand the DoD 
workforce’s attitude towards risk management and risk mitigation. Findings of the 
study will aid in improving training on risk management in order to improve the 
overall performance of weapon system programs. 
Two research experiments were run to assess the DoD workforce’s attitude to 
risk management. Experiments were selected to measure the participants’ decision-
making. These experiments provide an objective measure of the workforce’s attitude 
toward risk management. 
In both experiments, the participants were trying to achieve a cost target and 
could elect to take a risk-free approach with a fixed cost or a risk approach with a 
50/50 chance of a cost increase or decrease. The first experiment showed that the 
DoD workforce members were risk takers and found that 42% of the time, the 
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on budget. Also, the DoD acquisition workforce took risks 75% of the time when their 
“program” was over budget and took risks 70% of the time even when their 
“program” was under budget. The experiment also showed that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between years of experience and risk taking. 
The second experiment introduced a reward for the participants who came in 
under budget. The introduction of the reward had a very large impact on risk taking. 
The experiment found that 64% of the time, workforce members took risks even 
when they were on track to complete the project on time. In this case, the 
introduction of the reward increased risk taking by 50%. When over budget, 
participants took risks 95% of the time, a 27% increase due to the reward. When 
under budget, the participants took risks 89% of the time, a 27% increase due to the 
reward. 
The experiments were not designed to identify the reasons for the risk-taking 
behavior exhibited by the acquisition workforce. Postulated reasons include the 
following: trying to get a project over-cost back on budget; being under budget and 
thus able to withstand a cost increase; and taking risks because of a past positive 
experience taking risks. 
Keywords: DoD workforce, risk management, weapon system development, 
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I. Introduction 
This research project examines the behavior of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) workforce hypothesis regarding risk management in weapon system 
development. Two classroom experiments were conducted to understand how the 
workforce approaches risk management. The results will lead to more effective 
training of the workforce. 
A. Background 
Many DoD programs fall behind and suffer a cost increase and schedule 
delay. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2012) report stated, 
The total cost of DoD’s 2011 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs 
has grown by over $74 billion, or 5 percent, in the last year. The over $74.4 
billion in cost growth over the past year consists of a rise in development 
costs of $13.7 billion, or 4 percent, and an increase in procurement costs of 
$60.6 billion, or 5 percent. (p. 6) 
In addition, when compared to a program’s initial plans, the cost increase is 
much larger: 
When measured from their first full estimates, which have been put in place 
over a number of years, the growth in total acquisition cost for these 
programs is $447 billion, or 40 percent. (GAO, 2012, p. 6) 
Furthermore, from the same GAO (2012, p. 2) report, 
We found that most of these future programs are implementing acquisition 
reforms, such as competitive prototyping, early systems engineering reviews, 
and acquisition strategies ensuring competition or the option of competition, 
which have the potential to reduce risk and improve outcomes. Some of these 
activities require higher upfront investments in systems engineering and other 
areas to reduce longer term development risk, and it will be important for 
decision makers to sustain these investments when appropriate, even as 
DoD’s budgetary resources shrink. 
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… overall, most of the 37 programs we assessed are not fully adhering to a 
knowledge-based approach, putting them at higher risk of cost growth and 
schedule delays. 
B. Problem Statement 
DoD major weapon system programs continue to experience cost overruns 
and schedule delays. Risk management is an important engineering tool for 
minimizing the impact of technical problems of a program. More effective risk 
management will lead to better managed programs.  
C. Purpose of this Study 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the DoD workforce’s attitude 
towards risk management and risk mitigation. Findings of the study will aid in 
improving training on risk management in order to improve the overall performance 
of weapon system programs. 
D. Research Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research study is as follows: 
 The DoD workforce does not make data-driven decisions in risk 
management. 
E. Research Methodology 
This research project is based on two classroom experiments on the risk-
taking behavior of the DoD acquisition workforce. The first experiment involved 467 
workforce members, and the second experiment involved 98 workforce members. 
F. Objectives and Outcomes 
The desired outcome of this research is to make recommendations on 
improvements to the risk management process and improvements to training on risk 
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G. Limitations of the Study 
The research project is based on a sample of 565 Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) students of the 113,1001 employees (military and civilian) in one of 
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) career fields. The 
sample size covers 0.5% of the total DAWIA population. 
H. Validity of the Research 
The research is based on two experiments totaling 565 DoD workforce 
members. The research is directly applicable to DoD programs because all 
participants in the experiments are in one of the DoD DAWIA career fields. 
I. Reliability of the Responses 
The reliability of the responses is high. The participants voluntarily 
participated in the experiments, and no one faced any negative consequences for 
participating in or not participating in this study.
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II. Literature Review 
A. Risk 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, p. 690) explained risk in this way: “Risk is the 
potential that something will go wrong as a result of one or a series of events.” 
The DoD defined risk in the DoD Risk Management Guide (DoD, 2006, p. 1) 
as follows: 
Risk is a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance 
goals and objectives within defined cost, schedule and performance 
constraints.  Risk can be associated with all aspects of a program (e.g., 
threat, technology maturity, supplier capability, design maturation, 
performance against plan [sic]) as these aspects relate across the Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) and Integrated Master Schedule (IMS).  Risk 
addresses the potential variation in the planned approach and its expected 
outcome.  While such variation could include positive as well as negative 
effects, this guide will only address negative future effects since programs 
have typically experienced difficulty in this area during the acquisition 
process. 
Risks have the following three components:  
 a future root cause (yet to happen), which, if eliminated or corrected, 
would prevent a potential consequence from occurring; 
 a probability (or likelihood) assessed at the present time of that future 
root cause occurring; and  
 the consequence (or effect) of that future occurrence. 
A future root cause is the most basic reason for the presence of a risk.  
Accordingly, risks should be tied to future root causes and their effects.   
Charette (1989, p. 52) explained risk as follows: 
The definition of the word “risk” also makes a very clear statement that there 
will be a chance of loss associated with it. For instance, a sure loss is not a 
risk, because it has a certainty of occurrence. In “certainty situations,” the 
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losses or costs that exist. Thus, decisions are not influenced by a lack of 
information about the situation. 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, exists in the absence of information about 
past, present and future events, values or conditions. This means there is a 
lack of confidence in the correctness of the estimated probability distribution. 
Charette went on to explain, “For an event, action, thing, etc. to be considered 
a risk, there must be: 
1. A loss associated with it 
2. Uncertainty or chance involved 
3. Some choice involved.” 
 
In An Anatomy of Risk, Rowe (1977, p. 24) said, “Risk is the potential for 
realization of unwanted, negative consequences of an event.”  
Sir David Cox made an important point (as cited in Vose, 2000, p. 47): 
“Variability is a phenomenon in the physical world to be measured, analyzed and 
where appropriate explained. By contrast, uncertainty is an aspect of knowledge.” 
Vose (2008, p. 48) described uncertainty as follows: “Uncertainty is the 
assessor’s lack of knowledge … about the parameters that characterize the physical 
system that is being modeled.” 
Barkley (2004, p. xvii) explained risk management: 
Project risk management is an art, not a science. I have always been 
skeptical of scientific and overly quantitative answers to complex social, 
organizational and project outcomes, especially when customers, product and 
markets are involved. … Risk is no longer looked at as a single project issue. 
… Over emphasis on quantitative tools and mathematical models suggests 
RM [risk management] as a science rather than an art. 
Grey (1995, p. 69) wrote, 
Human estimators will always be drawing on past experience, their own and 
that of other people, and adjusting it to allow for the special factors of the 
case they are now looking at. No estimate is untouched by human hand. 
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The following are the key concepts from these sources: 
 Risk includes uncertainty. 
 Program risk management can’t be described by a quantitative model. 
 Effective risk management will draw on peoples’ experiences. 
 Historical data may be lacking, and even if it exists, it will have some 
subjectivity built into the data. 
B. Risk Management Experiments Involving the DoD 
Acquisition Workforce 
Past research projects involving experimentally measuring the risk behavior 





















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 9 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
III. Research Methodology 
A. Research Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research study is as follows: 
 The DoD workforce does not make data-driven decisions in risk 
management. 
B. Research Experiments 
Two research experiments were run to assess the DoD workforce’s attitude to 
risk management. Experiments were selected to measure the actual decisions made 
by the participants. These experiments provide an objective measure of the 
workforce’s attitude toward risk management. 
Both experiments were designed to measure the participant’s decision-
making behaviors when faced with uncertain outcomes. The second experiment also 
included a small reward to determine if a reward impacted the findings of the first 
experiment. 
1. Experiment #1 
The first experiment was completed by 467 DoD acquisition workforce 
members attending a DAU class. The experiment was run in 14 DAU classes from 
March 22, 2011, to September 12, 2011. Classes included ACQ-201B, SYS-302, 
SAM-301, IRM-304, BCF-211, LOG-350, LOG-236, and CON-2152. The experiment 
took about 10 minutes to complete, and participants kept track of their decisions on 
forms that the researcher then used to analyze their decision-making.  
Students also provided their DAWIA career field and their number of years of 
work experience. 
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In Experiment #1, each student was faced with six decisions.3 The student 
started with zero actual costs and had six periods (months) of expenses. If the 
participant selected a risk-free approach, the period’s expense was $10. Therefore, 
if the student took the risk-free approach for all six decisions, the student would have 
accumulated a total expense of $60. 
However, at each decision point, the student could elect to take on risk to try 
and reduce the expense for the period. A realistic scenario for this situation might be 
the adoption of new technology to meet an aggressive schedule, reduce costs, or 
achieve a challenging performance target. 
At each decision point, the student could select the risk-free or risk-taking 
approach. That is, the students were free to change their strategy at each of the six 
decision points. 
If the participant decided to take on risk, there was a 50% probability (p = 0.5) 
that the month’s expenses would be $5 and a 50% probability that they would be 
$20. When risk is taken, the expected outcome4 is $12.50. Hence, on average, 
participants will lose money if they take on risk. Since there are only six periods, 
some students will “beat” the odds and come in under budget, while others will be 
over budget. 
An additional part of the experiment was the target total cost. Fifty percent 
(50%) of the students had a target cost of $55, while the remainder had a target cost 
of $60. Therefore, someone not taking risk would only be on budget if they had a 
target of $60 but would be over budget if they had a target cost of $55. 
                                            
3  In the experiment, each decision was for one month of a program. 
4 Expected outcome is what the outcome would be if a very large number of trials were undertaken. 
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There wasn’t a reward offered in the exercise, although the vast majority of 
the students took the experiment seriously and enjoyed the exercise (based on 
observations, comments from students, and comments from instructors). 
2. Experiment #2 
The second experiment was designed to validate the results of the first 
experiment regarding risk/rewards. The experiment was run for three classes from 
October 3, 2011, until March 25, 2012. Ninety-eight (98) students participated from 
an ACQ-201B, SAM-301, and SYS-203 class.5 
The experiment took about 10 minutes to complete, and participants kept 
track of their decisions on forms that the researcher then used to analyze the results. 
Students also provided their DAWIA career field and their number of years of work 
experience. 
The target total expense for all of the participants in Experiment #2 was $50 
(this differed from Experiment #1). 
Each participant was faced with five decisions. The participant started with 
zero actual costs and had five periods of expenses. If a risk-free approach was 
taken, each period’s expense was $10. Therefore, if the participant took the risk-free 
approach for all five decisions, the participant would accumulate a total expense of 
$50 and would meet the cost target. 
However, at each decision point, the participant could elect to take on risk to 
try and reduce the actual expenses. When the participant took risk, there was a 50% 
probability (p = 0.5) that the month’s expenses would be $8, and there was a 50% 
probability that they would be $14. The expected outcome was $11. The range of 
expenses was from $40 to $70. 
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At each decision point, the participant could select the risk or risk-free 
approach. That is, the participants were free to change their strategy at each of the 
five decision points. 
Therefore, if the participant took the risk-free approach for all five decisions, 
they met their budget target of $50. However, if they took risk for each period, the 
participants would be over budget by an average of $5. Since there were only five 
trials, some participants “beat” the odds and came in under budget, while others 
were over budget. 
There was a small reward offered to people who met or came in under the 
target expense of $50 or lower. There was an incentive to at least meet the target 
expense of $50. Rewards ranged from PEZ candy dispensers to coffee mugs. The 
person with the lowest total expense was the first to select a prize.  
C. Data Collection 
All participants recorded their decisions on a form handed out at the 
beginning of the experiment. After completing the experiment, the researcher 
entered the data into an Excel file for analysis. Data recorded included the 
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IV. Data Analysis 
In this section, the raw data from the experiments are presented. Findings of 
the research are presented in Chapter 5.  
Two research experiments were run to assess the DoD workforce’s attitude to 
risk management. Experiments were selected to measure the participants’ decision-
making. These experiments provide an objective measure of the workforce’s attitude 
toward risk management. 
The following sub-sections present the data from the two experiments. 
A. DoD Acquisition Workforce by Career Field 
The distribution of the DoD acquisition workforce by career field is shown in 
Figure 1 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2012, p. 5). There are over 151,000 members in the 
acquisition career fields. The percentages of each career are as follows: 
 Research & Engineering (SPRDE): 28% 
 Contracting (CON): 20% 
 Program Management (PM): 11% 
 Logistics (LOG): 11% 
 Production, Quality, & Manufacturing (PQM): 6% 
 Test & Evaluation (T&E): 6% 
 Business Cost Estimating and Financial Management (BCEFE or 
BCF): 5% 
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 All others6: 9% 
 
Figure 1. Breakdown of the Total DoD Acquisition Workforce by  
Career Field 
1. Experiment #1—Participants by Career Field 
The distribution of the participants by career field for Experiment #1 is shown 
in Figure 2. The distribution for Experiment #1 was higher for SPRDE, LOG, and IT 
and lower for CON and PM, compared to the overall population of the DAWIA 
workforce.  
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Figure 2. Breakdown of Participants by Career Field for Experiment #1 
2. Experiment #1—Participants by the Number of Years of 
Experience 
The total number of years of professional experience, either as a government 
civilian, military, or in any industry, averaged 17.7 years. The distribution is shown in 
Figure 3. Forty-two percent (42%) had 21 or more years of experience. Only 6% had 
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Figure 3. Breakdown of Participants by Experience Level for  
Experiment #1 
3. Experiment #1—Theoretical Outcomes 
The participants could choose the risk-free approach ($10 in expenses) or 
could take risk in which case there was a 50% chance that expenses would be $5 
and a 50% that expenses would be $20. The number of possible solutions is shown 
in Figure 4. The “spider web” chart shows the cost variance (CV)7 for each of the 
periods of the experiment. All solutions had a CV = 0 at the beginning of the 
experiment. Depending on the choice of risk versus no risk, and the 50/50 chance of 
either $5 or $20, the CV would go up or down over time. The maximum positive CV 
(budget surplus) was $30 and the maximum negative CV (budget overrun) was -$60. 
                                            
7 Cost variance (CV) is the actual cost minus the budgeted cost. A positive CV is favorable, a 
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Figure 4. Possible Solutions for Experiment #1  
(Cost Variances by Period) 
Figure 4 shows the possible solutions, but not the distribution of solutions. For 
the participants who had a budget target of $60, if the participant decided not to take 
any risk, then the expected solution was a budget expense of $60 and a CV of $0 
(see Figure 5). There was a 100% probability that the total expense would be $60. 
For participants who had a budget target of $55, a risk-free approach resulted 
in a cost variance of -$5 (i.e., a cost overrun). The distribution of outcomes was the 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Solutions for Experiment #1 When a Risk-Free  
Decision is Made for All Six Periods ($60 Cost Target) 
However, if a participant who had a $60 cost target took risk at every 
opportunity, then the solution was a binomial solution with p = 0.5 (see Figure 6). 
Because the possible cost variance at each decision point was either +$5 or -$10, 
and there were six tasks subjected to risk, there were only seven possible outcomes. 
The mean cost variance for the distribution of outcomes was -$15 (a 25% increase 
in cost). 
For participants who had a budget target of $55, the distribution of cost 
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Figure 6. Distribution of Solutions for Experiment #1 When the  
Participants Always Choose the Risk Option for All 6 Periods 
($60 Cost Target) 
If the participant chose the risk-free option 33.3% of the time, and therefore, 
both of the random outcomes occurred 33.3% of the time, the distribution of final 
cost variances was a normal distribution with a mean of -$10 and a standard 
deviation of $11.1 (see Figure 7). The maximum CV was $30 (i.e., a budget surplus) 
and the minimum CV was -$60 (i.e., a cost overrun). 
For participants who had a budget target of $55, the distribution of cost 
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Figure 7. Distribution of Solutions for Experiment #1 When All the  
Solutions Are Equally Likely ($60 Cost Target) 
4. Experiment #1—Results 
The experimental data was analyzed to understand the following: 
1. How likely was the participant to take risk? 
2. How likely was the participant to take risk when the participant’s cost 
variance was positive (i.e., when the participant’s program was under 
budget/favorable)? 
3. How likely was the participant to take risk when the participant’s cost 
variance was negative (i.e., when the participant’s program was over 
budget/unfavorable)? 
4. Does the propensity to take risk vary by career field? 
5. Does the propensity to take risk vary by the years of experience? 
Four hundred and sixty-seven (467) people participated in the study. The data 
was analyzed at every period to determine how likely the participants were to take 
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is, for every period, the participant’s risk taking as a function of cost variance was 
quantified.  
The risk-taking behavior is very interesting. When the program was on 
budget, the participants took risk only 42% of the time (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Risk Taking by the Participants who Had a  
CV of 0 (i.e., On Budget) 
However, if the program was over budget (i.e., if the program’s CV was 
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o  
Figure 9. Risk Taking by the Participants who Had a Negative CV  
(i.e., Over Budget) 
If the program was under budget (i.e., the program’s CV was positive), then 
the participants took risk 70% of the time (this value is statistically different from the 
“over budget” value at the 99.7% confidence level). See Figure 10. 
o  
Figure 10. Risk Taking by the Participants Who Had a Positive CV  
(i.e., Under Budget) 
The experiment did not determine the reasons for taking risk when under 
budget. One possible explanation for risk-taking for people over budget is that they 
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For those under budget, one possible explanation for risk taking is that the 
participants’ attitude towards risk changed when they were under budget. More 
specifically, when they were under budget, they could afford to task risk. Another 
possible explanation is that a participant had taken risk previously and had been 
successful and, therefore, the participant was hopeful of another favorable result. 
5. Experiment #1—Risk Taking by Career Field 
Figure 11 shows the overall risk taking by career field. The y-axis is the 
probability of someone in that career field taking risk under any situation. The data 
labels above the bars are the number of people in that group. The average risk 
taking for all acquisition positions was 66%.  
Career fields that had a higher level of risk taking compared to the average 
are LOG, CON, PQM, and “Other.” 8 
Participants in the SPRDE and PM career fields took risk at a level below the 
average. 
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Figure 11. Overall Risk Taking by Career Field 
Figure 12 shows how often people in the major DAWIA career fields took on 
risk depending on the status of the simulated program. The green bars show the risk 
taking that occurred when the program was under budget, the red bars show the risk 
taking when the program was on budget, and the blue bars show the risk taking that 
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Figure 12. Risk Taking by Career Field When the Program Was 
 Below, On, or Over Budget 
For most of the career fields—LOG, SPRDE, CON, PM, IT, and BCF—the 
risk taking when the programs were on budget was lower than when it was above or 
below budget.  
When the actual costs exceeded budget (i.e., CV was negative), most career 
fields showed an increase in risk taking. But most participants took an equal amount 
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However, the PQM career field does not fit the trend of the other career fields. 
For PQM professionals, they took on more risk when the program was on budget 
than when it was under or over budget. 
The career fields included in “other”9 showed greater risk taking when the 
program costs were above budget. 
6. Experiment #1—Risk Taking by Experience Level 
Figure 13 shows the overall risk taking by years of experience. The y-axis is 
the probability of someone taking risk under any situation. The participants have 
been separated into six groups with varying levels of experience: 0 to 2 years, 3 to 5 
years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to 20 years, and 21 years and above. 
The data labels above the bars are the number of people in that group. The 
average risk taking for all acquisition positions was 66%.  
There is not a strong relationship with years of experience. A linear 
regression of the full dataset shows a 0.12% change per year with a R2 of 0.0012. 
Hence, there is no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and years 
of experience. 
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Figure 13. Risk Taking by Experience Level 
B. Experiment #2 
The second experiment was designed to validate the results of the first 
experiment regarding risk/rewards. The experiment was run for three classes from 
October 3, 2011, until March 25, 2012. Ninety-eight (98) students participated from 
ACQ-201B, SAM-301, and SYS-203 classes. 
The experiment took about 10 minutes to complete, and participants kept 
track of their decisions on forms that the researcher then used to analyze the results. 
Students also provided their DAWIA career field and their number of years of work 
experience. 
The target total expense for all of the participants in Experiment #2 was $50 
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Each participant was faced with five decisions.10 The participant started with 
zero actual costs and had five periods of expenses. If a risk-free approach was 
taken, each period’s expense was $10. Therefore, if the participant took the risk-free 
approach for all five decisions, the participant would accumulate a total expense of 
$50 and would meet their budget objective (CV = 0). 
However, at each decision point, participants could elect to take on risk to try 
and reduce their actual expenses. When the participant took risk, there was a 50% 
probability (p = 0.5) that the month’s expenses would be $8, and there was a 50% 
probability that they would be $14. The expected outcome11 of taking risk was $11. 
The full range of possible total expenses was from $40 to $70. 
At each decision point, the participant could select the risk or risk-free 
approach. That is, the participants were free to change their strategy at each of the 
five decision points. If they took risk for each period, the participants would be over 
budget by an average of $5. Since there were only five trials, some participants 
“beat” the odds and came in under budget, while others were over budget. 
There was a small reward offered to people who met or came in under the 
target expense of $50. There was an incentive to at least meet the target expense of 
$50. Prizes ranged from PEZ candy dispensers to coffee mugs. The person with the 
lowest total expense was the first to select their prize.  
1. Experiment #2—Participants by Career Field 
The distribution of the participants in Experiment #2 (see Figure 14) was 
higher for SPRDE, LOG, and IT and lower for CON and PM, compared to the overall 
population of the DAWIA workforce (shown in Figure 1).  
                                            
10  In the experiment, each decision was for one month of a program. 
11 Expected outcome is what the outcome would be if a very large number of trials were undertaken. 
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Figure 14. Breakdown of Participants Participating in Experiment #2  
by Career Field 
2. Experiment #2—Participants by the Number of Years of 
Experience 
The total number of years of professional experience, either in the civilian 
government workforce, the military, or any industry, averaged 12.3 years. The 
distribution is shown in the following figure. Twenty-six percent (26%) had 21 or 
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Figure 15. Breakdown of Students Participating in Experiment #2  
by Experience Level 
3. Experiment #2—Theoretical Outcomes 
The participants could choose the risk-free approach ($10 in expenses) or 
could take some risk, in which case there was a 50% chance that they would have 
an expense of $8 and the other 50% of the time an expense of $14. The number of 
possible solutions is shown in Figure 16. The “spider web” chart shows the cost 
variance (CV)12 for each of the periods of the experiment. All solutions have a CV = 0 
at the beginning of the experiment. Depending on the choice of risk versus no risk, 
and the 50/50 chance of either $8 or $14, the CV could go up or down over time. 
The maximum positive CV (budget surplus) was $10 and the maximum negative CV 
(budget overrun) was -$20. 
                                            
12 Cost variance (CV) is the actual cost minus the budgeted cost. A positive CV is favorable, a 
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Figure 16. Possible Solutions for Experiment #2  
(Cost Variances by Period) 
Figure 16 shows the possible solutions, but not the distribution of solutions. If 
a participant did not take any risk, then the expected solution was $0 CV (see Figure 
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Figure 17. Distribution of Solutions for Experiment #2 When the  
Risk-Free Decision is Made for Every Period 
However, if a participant took risk at every opportunity, then the solution was 
a binomial distribution with p = 0.5 (see Figure 18). Because the possible cost 
variance at each decision point was either +$2 or -$4 and there were five tasks 
subjected to risk, there were only six possible outcomes. The mean cost variance for 
the distribution of outcomes was -$5 (a 10% increase in cost). 
 
Figure 18. Distribution of Solutions for Experiment #2 When  
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If the participant chose the risk-free option 33.3% of the time, in which case 
there was a 50% chance that they would have an expense of $8 and the other 50% 
of the time an expense of $14, the distribution of final cost variances was a normal 
distribution (see Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19. Distribution of Solutions for Experiment #2 When All the  
Solutions Are Equally Likely 
4. Experiment #2—Results 
The experimental data was analyzed to understand the following: 
1. How likely was the participant to take risk? 
2. How likely was the participant to take risk when the participant’s cost 
variance was positive (i.e., when the participant’s program was under 
budget/favorable)? 
3. How likely was the participant to take risk when the participant’s cost 
variance was negative (i.e., when the participant’s program was over 
budget/unfavorable)? 
Ninety-eight (98) people participated in Experiment #2. Their overall 
willingness to take on risk was examined and is shown in the following three figures. 
At every interval, the risk taking as a function of cost variance was quantified. When 
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64% of the time (see Figure 20). With a 50/50 chance of a cost increase for each 
period, 32% of the programs would go over cost during the period. 
o  
Figure 20. Percentage of People Who Took On Risk With a CV of 0 
 (i.e., On Budget) 
However, if the program was over budget (i.e., if the program’s CV was 
negative), then the participants took risk 95% of the time (see Figure 21). The 
experiment did not determine the reasons for taking risk when over budget. One 
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o  
Figure 21. Percentage of People Who Took On Risk With a Negative CV 
 (i.e., Over Budget) 
If the program was under budget (i.e., the CV was positive), then the 
participants took risk 89% of the time (see Figure 22). The experiment did not 
determine the reasons for this behavior. One possible explanation for risk taking is 
that the participants’ attitudes towards risk changed when they were under budget. 
More specifically, when they were under budget they could afford to take risk. 
Another possible explanation is that participants had taken risk previously and had 
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Figure 22. Percentage of People Who Took On Risk With a Positive CV  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Two research experiments were run to assess the DoD workforce’s attitude to 
risk management. Experiments were selected to measure the decisions made by the 
participants in simulated situations. These experiments provide an objective 
measure of the workforce’s attitude toward risk management. 
Both experiments were designed to measure the participant’s decision-
making behavior when faced with uncertain outcomes. The second experiment also 
included a small reward to determine if a reward impacted the findings of the first 
experiment. 
The experiments were run with DoD acquisition workforce members attending 
a DAU class. The experience level of the participants was high, with an average of 
16 years of total work experience.  
A. Finding 1 (Experiment #1) 
Based on the results of Experiment #1, the DoD acquisition workforce 
exhibited risky decision-making even when “programs” were on budget. Experiment 
#1 found that 42% of the time, the workforce member took risks even when they 
were on track to complete the project on budget.  
B. Finding 2 (Experiment #1) 
Based on the results of Experiment #1, the DoD acquisition workforce took 
risk 75% of the time when their “program” was over budget.  
C. Finding 3 (Experiment #1) 
Based on the results of Experiment #1, the DoD acquisition workforce took 
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D. Finding 4 (Experiment #1) 
Based on the results of Experiment #1, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between years of experience and risk taking.  
E. Review (Experiment #1) 
Experiment #1 did not attempt to understand the reasons for the risk-taking 
behavior exhibited by the acquisition workforce.13 When a program/project/task is 
over budget, there is the desire to get back on budget even though the participant 
knows that there is a chance that the situation will become worse. In the experiment, 
there was a 50/50 chance that things would improve. In real-life scenarios, the 
chance for success could be much less, making risk taking an even worse decision. 
When a program was on budget in Experiment #1 simulations, there was still 
a relatively high (42%) level of risk taking by the participants. 
When a participant’s program was under budget, it was very surprising to find 
that 70% of the participants took risk even though they knew there was only a 50/50 
chance of success. A possible explanation is the attitude that since they were under 
budget, they could afford to take risk. Another possible explanation is that 
participants had taken risk previously and had been successful and, therefore, they 
might have ignored the 50/50 chance of a cost increase. 
F. Experiment #2 
Experiment #2 differed from Experiment #1 primarily due to an award to the 
participants who met or came in under their budgeted cost. 
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G. Finding 1 (Experiment #2) 
Based on the results from Experiment #2, the DoD acquisition workforce 
exhibited risky decision-making even when “programs” were on budget. Experiment 
#2 found that 64% of the time, the workforce member took risks even when they 
were on track to complete the project on time. This level of risk taking is a 52% 
increase from Experiment #1. 
H. Finding 2 (Experiment #2) 
Based on the experimental results, the DoD acquisition workforce took risk 
95% of the time when their “program” was over budget. This level of risk taking is 
27% higher than Experiment #1. 
I. Finding 3 (Experiment #2) 
Based on the experimental results, the DoD acquisition workforce took risk 
89% of the time even when their “program” was under budget. This level of risk 
taking is 27% higher than Experiment #1. 
J. Review (Experiment #2) 
Experiment #2 differed from Experiment #1 primarily due to an award to the 
participants who met or came in under their budgeted cost. The experiment showed 
an even greater level of risk taking by the workforce. When a participant was either 
under budget or over budget, there was a 27% increase in risk taking when there 
was a reward. When the participant was on track to meet the budget, there was a 
50% increase in risk taking (from 42% to 64%) when there was a reward. 
K. Recommendations for Training 
The workforce has demonstrated risk taking even when the expected 
outcome will worsen the situation. The opportunity for a reward increased the level 
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Based on these results and general discussions with people involved in risk 
management, additional risk management training should cover the following topics: 
1. Basic probability training (~1 hr) 
2. Review of economic risk & reward (~ 2 hr) 
3. Basic business case analysis (~1 hr) 
4. Review of the risk management process (specifically focused on 
identification, analysis and mitigation planning) (~2.5 hr) 
5. Simulated decision-making (~1.5 hr) 
6. Case studies (~2 hr) 
The total recommended training is 10 hr with the training customized for the 
organization using case histories and the organization’s risk management process.  
L. Recommendations for Future Research 
The big unanswered question is “Why?”  The risk-taking behavior of the DoD 
workforce has been studied, but the reasons for the risky behavior have not been 
determined. Finding some or all of the root causes will enable more effective training 
and risk management. 
In addition, there was not a negative outcome in the two experiments. Hence, 
the risk taking when there are positive and negative outcomes may differ from the 
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